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Abstract. The paper addresses the issue of how racialized intercultural 
relations can problematize the formation of narrative identity. How it 
can call in question the narratability of racialized subjectivity and lead 
to conflicting narrative identites of the same character as inferrible from 
narratorial discourse, vis-à-vis the way the character views itself in its 
intramental activity. And how all of this follows from, and is traceable 
through the manifestations of, racialized cognitive architecture, and thus, 
paradoxically, unnarratability can become the source of narrativity. The 
conflicting nature of racialized subjectivity and narrative identity formation 
will be examined, then, through a socio-cognitive lens. This study will draw 
on Nadine Gordimer’s apartheid-era novel, The Conservationist (1974) as a 
tutor text and will be informed especially by colonial/postcolonial theory, 
cultural as well as cognitive narratology, cognitive cultural studies, theories 
of intercultural communication, and discourse analysis. 
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Introduction
The main character, always in focus in Nadine Gordimer’s apartheid-period 
narrative The Conservationist (1974) is Mehring, a middle-aged, rich white 
industrialist, the director of an investment fund and a member of more boards of 
directors than he cares to keep count of, who – although he is not a farmer – buys 
himself a farm on the money he earned in industry. He does it “to make contact 
with the land” and “as a sign of having remained fully human and capable of 
enjoying the simple things of life that poorer men can no longer afford.” It is a 
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“weed-choked, neglected” farm, “a dirty piece of land, agriculturally speaking” 
(1978, 22). For tax reasons he could have left it “misused or wasted,” but he 
decided to stop “the rot,” clean up the place, make it productive (1978, 23). 
Although he has an experienced black foreman, Jacobus, who runs the farm and 
manages the black farm workers with great skill, Mehring is the farmer, the boss. 
He thinks he has “to keep half an eye (all he could spare) on everything” (1978, 
23). He is open to learning new facts, ready to cope with the new situation since 
this is what industry required from him in the city after all: he was “accustomed 
to digesting new facts and coping with new situations” (1978, 23). 
But is he open to learn, is he ready to cope with the situation, really? What 
the Transvaal countryside has in store for the central character of this apartheid 
narrative in terms of human environment – the Afrikaners-alias-the-Boers-alias-
the Dutch, the Greeks, the Asian Indians, and especially the native black Africans 
(even if safely segregated in “the location”) – both irritates and confuses him to 
a greater and greater degree. All this on top of a leftist mistress, Antonia, whom 
he helps to flee abroad (1978, 264), and a son, Terry with “well-meaning, if half-
baked, social conscience” (Smith 1993, 50), with whom the generation gap could 
not be wider (add a divorced wife, who is an insufferable nuisance to him). 
So the more we get to know of Mehring, the less we know who he is. And he 
has the same problem with himself. Thus the novel is gradually developing into 
a journey, which is his quest for self-definition although, puzzling as it is, he 
could not be more solidly defined than he is – by the racial and social position 
that he occupies and the ideological conformity he represents in apartheid 
society. He is “a fundamental pillar of the oppressive system in South Africa” 
(Clingman 1990, 209). What we have as his story unfolds are more and more 
messed-up relationships: interpersonal, interracial, intercultural disengagement, 
and contrived or cut-off communication in all of these respects.
The author decided not to help her reader. As Nadine Gordimer made it plain in 
the Jannika Hurwitt-interview, in The Conservationist “you have a real narrator,” 
“with a totally dispassionate view from outside,” but the book is predominantly 
an interior monologue (Mehring’s for the most part, but not always), and the line 
between when Mehring is speaking and when he is not “is very vague” (1990, 
147). Although the dispassionate narrator clearly, though implicitly, represents 
Gordimer’s antiapartheid stance (much-discussed in Gordimer criticism), and in 
various ways it is Mehring who is in the explicit or implicit focus of the intramental 
and intermental activities1 of the other characters too, narrative comprehension 
does take considerable effort on the part of the reader. The reason why habitual 
narrative-comprehension mechanisms fail us is the vague line just mentioned: 
1 Theoretical concepts coming from cognitive narratology like “intramental activity” and 
“intermental activity” will be much more useful for us than “interior monologue” and “dialogue” 
since the whole novel is cognition – chiefly Mehring’s – after all.
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the presented intramental activity “jumps about from different points of view” in 
the book (Hurwitt 1990, 147). “I chose to ignore,” Gordimer admits, “that one had 
to explain anything at all. I decided that if the reader didn’t make the leap in his 
mind, if the allusions were puzzling to him—too bad” (Hurwitt 1990, 148).
When leaps in our mind are needed to yield clues to understanding a narrative, 
narrative coherence is accessible through inferences. The latter are what 
Gordimer’s leap-in-the-reader’s-mind idea translates into. Constructionist theory 
of inference generation distinguishes local and global coherence inferences as 
well as explanatory and communicative2 ones (Graesser, Singer and Trabasso 
1994, especially 375–376). The allusions that trigger those inferences can be overt, 
but in this case are more characteristically covert, embedded in the narrative 
discourse, which is to say: they are implied. It is so because the true nature of 
the society the novel is about must “reveal itself,” Gordimer argues in the Pat 
Schwartz-interview: “The suffering inflicted by White on Black, the ambiguities 
of feeling, the hypocrisy, the courage, the lies, the sham and shame—they are all 
there, implicit. If you write honestly about life in South Africa, apartheid damns 
itself”  (1990, 83; emphasis in the original).
Racialized Cognitive Architecture: Intentionality
The Conservationist invites us into Mehring’s and other characters’ cognition, 
their intramental and intermental activities, then. Thus what we have to engage, 
when trying to make sense of this narratively organized discourse, is the basic 
source and container of the cognition of the novel’s fictional minds (and ours): 
their (and our) cognitive architecture. The many kinds and formalized models 
of cognitive architecture aside (from neuroscience and cognitive psychology 
through artificial intelligence), for narratological purposes cognitive architecture 
is “the range of databases” in our mind that are affected by new information, our 
“knowledge stores” (Zunshine 2006, 48–49). The attempt to interpret Mehring’s 
fictional mind is also to examine the cognitive architecture behind his cognition, 
by the light of our own. We try to interpret his by mobilizing our own. It is in his 
cognitive architecture, where we can find what makes a mentality like his tick; 
where we can also hope to discern clues to some of the allusions Gordimer talks 
about. And it will be the hidden allusions, together with what triggers them, on 
what we can draw our inferences regarding the baffling phenomenon Mehring is. 
Antiapartheid Gordimer’s method of presenting apartheid society in the fictional 
2 The last one (the “communicative exchange between reader and author” – Graesser, Singer 
and Trabasso 1994, 376) is conceived in the present paper as modified by psychonarratologists 
Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon, to mean communication between the narrator and the reader, 
and not the author and the reader (Bortolussi and Dixon 2003, 16).
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universe of The Conservationist makes it possible for her to condemn that society 
implicitly, i.e. without making her objective narrator judgmental. She described 
the method to one of her interviewers in simple terms: “I thrust my hand as deep 
as it will go, deep into the life around me, and I write about what comes up” 
(Schwartz 1990, 83). But she writes about it in such a manner that judgement is 
left, through the allusions, to the reader’s ability to infer. Apartheid will then fall 
to the ground by its own weight.
If – to borrow and extend Gordimer’s metaphor – we thrust our metaphorical 
hands deep into the novel, what comes up is a man whose narrative identity is 
both a solid logical product, constructed by the apartheid social environment and 
– for the same reason – an identity falling apart before our eyes until he becomes 
totally dysfunctional in terms of interpersonal and intercultural communication. 
Socially, he is a successful industrialist. Innately, he is not a bad human 
individual. Yet he is a dismal failure socially too, to such an extent that Mehring, 
the boss who lords over everything, ends up on the ground, physically and in a 
moral sense, with an apprehension that he will be killed in the next moment and 
will not even know why. Is his whole problem – and it is now readerly inference 
– ignorance? Failed identity formation (another readerly inference)? A failure 
that does not know itself? Or rather, a failure that does know, but does not want to 
acknowledge itself? As Judith Levy suggests, “Mehring is already a dead man, but 
he does not know it. Or at least that knowledge is kept at an unconscious level 
as ‘unwelcome knowledge’” (Levy 2006, 108)? My suggestion below will be that 
he does know and is conscious of it, but is reluctant to act upon that knowledge.
So the reader thrusts his or her metaphorical hand into the novel and what 
comes up is a central personality, to whose identity we gain access through his 
own thoughts and recollections. But the protagonist does not see the first and 
most important aspect of his identity: the extent to which it has been claimed by 
apartheid, whose racist relational and communicative logic he internalized. While 
processing The Conservationist’s narrative discourse as readers, we sense that we 
are dealing with two conflicting identities, then: one which develops through 
Mehring’s narrative of himself, and one that the objective narrator develops about 
Mehring. How can we trace where we are with those two narrators, separately 
and vis-à-vis each other, and then, eventually, with the narrative subject called 
Mehring? We can trace it by examining Mehring’s cognitive architecture by the light 
of our own knowledge stores, as the only way to recognize some of the allusions 
that Gordimer had in mind in the interview quoted above – and then by making 
our readerly inferences. Such an investigation involves, in turn, examining those 
two of the four levels of cognitive architecture that Patrick Colm Hogan calls the 
level of intentionalism (the character’s goals, beliefs, intentions)3 and the level 
3 “Intentionalism” as defined by Hogan and applied in this paper is not to be confused with Lisa 
Zunshine’s “intentionality,” a broader term which covers all declaired and concealed intentions 
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of representationalism (the system of structures as well as mental processes and 
contents of the character’s cognition; e.g. images of experience) (2010, 239).
“The portrayal of a particular mind-style can often be a major objective of 
a literary work (probably the major objective [...]),” Catherine Emmott asserts, 
“and is important for the reader’s overall interpretation of the work” (1997, 30; 
emphasis in the original). It is enough to look at the level of intentionalism in 
Mehring’s cognitive architecture to realize that his mind-style is the clue to an 
overall interpretation of The Conservationist . But to draw up an inventory of the 
intentionalist domain of his mind only to prove that he is a racist tycoon and a 
misogynistic male – something that has been established about him by critics 
so many times (often rather one-sidedly) – would be superfluous and not to the 
point in the present context. Instead, let it suffice to quote some examples that 
would illuminate the point about the conflicting nature of the two identities: 
the protagonist’s identity as he views himself as opposed to the identity that 
emerges from the objective narrator’s discourse, and to how it is rooted in the 
intentionalist realm of the protagonist’s cognitive architecture. 
Mehring’s beliefs and convictions spring from his aversion to, and disdain for, 
blacks, also for the Afrikaners/Boers/Dutch; and from the social position which 
makes it possible for him to buy whatever he wants to, especially property and 
women. His intentional thinking is fully racialized and sexualized. As Rose 
Pettersson puts it: he “ruthlessly exploits whatever and whoever comes in his way 
in order to achieve his own gratification” (1995, 91). His treatment of a girl on an 
airflight – Dorothy Driver’s example – is totally “de-personalizing” (1990, 187). Not 
that his ruthlessness is that of a zealous backer of the apartheid, though. It is rather 
nonchalant. “[T]he Great Impartial” – these are the politically radical Antonia’s 
condemning words; “[T]he politics are of no concern. The ideology doesn’t matter” 
(1978, 82). Mehring nonchalantly accepts what an apartheid society has to offer 
a wealthy white male, not only in social advantages but also in racist clichés, 
true. Nonchalantly but not quite unthinkingly. He is intelligent enough to have 
apprehensions: “Soon, in this generation or the next, it must be our turn to starve 
and suffer. Why not?” – he is meditating, lying on the ground, with earth in his 
mouth (1978, 46–47). The bodily position is a reminder of the black stranger found 
dead, face down, in Mehring’s third pasture and hastily and insensitively dumped 
into a shallow grave by the racist Afrikaner police but later washed up by incessant 
rain and flooding, as a symbolic reminder – a ghost that keeps haunting Mehring as 
it were. The murdered subaltern of postcolonial South Africa4 is haunting Mehring, 
aimed at characters, readers by other characters, narrators, and authors. Zunshine distinguishes 
seven embedded levels of intentionality in a single Virginia Woolf paragraph (2010b: 206–207). 
4 The racial institution of apartheid was established (in 1948) many years after the country had 
already been granted the status of a sovereign state (in 1934), thus, formally, South Africa was 
no longer a colony at the time the action takes place.
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the postcolonial colonizer – who “fails to realize that the colonial era has already 
come to an end” (Kathrin M. Wagner 1993, 84).5 But it is also an allusion to some 
dull, unconfessed remorse that does not know itself. It is the objective narrator’s 
allusive device encouraging both backward-oriented and forward-oriented readerly 
inferencing. One, white minority rule denies black native majority land and life, 
Mehring being the foregrounded representative case in point – a backward-oriented 
inference. Two, the reader’s forward-oriented inference that the dead man needs 
to be properly buried anticipates that he will be eventually buried decently by 
the blacks at the end of the novel, a concluding incident coded with significant 
meaning (about that significance later below).
But the predominant motives of the Mehring phenomenon, determining his 
cognitive architecture on the intentionalist level can be found in the multiple 
meanings of his being a conservationist. Two of these meanings/allusions are 
overt, both Mehring and the reader are aware of them. The third is covert and 
Gordimer (her objective narrator, that is) leaves it to the reader to work for it. 
Firstly, Mehring is an avowed conservationist in the most common (and in 
itself conflictive) sense of environment protection: he wants to stop “the rot,” 
clean up the land as I have already mentioned. Protection of the environment 
is a cause that he takes so seriously that, for one, he prohibits the farm workers’ 
children to play games with guinea fowl eggs (1978, 12). He also refines that 
agenda to the point that it swings over into its own parody: “He is pathologically 
concerned with the conservation of the land, and he cannot allow himself to 
drop as much as a cigarette end on his farm” (Pettersson 1995, 94). But the real 
conflicting elements of the conservationist component of the environmental 
protectionist’s narrative identity are not these; rather, it is how an oversensitive 
relation to the physical environment (the country, the continent, the oceans, the 
sky [1978, 11]) is almost totally insensitive to what is happening to, and what he 
himself is doing to, the human environment. Insensitive on the level of routine 
intermental activities at least;6 intramentally it is a much more complex issue 
as indicated above and will be further elaborated below. Another – similarly 
overt – “conservationist” in him is the one that contributes to the conservation 
of the racist system, a characteristic that his conscientious-objector son, Terry 
challenges and his leftist mistress, Antonia castigates with scorn. As we have 
seen, Mehring has his apprehensions (of the blacks taking over one day, maybe), 
5 This is the generally accepted view concerning Mehring, but I side with Lars Engle, who refines 
the point: “Mehring seems to imagine himself specifically defending industrialism against 
romantics who find it distasteful, rather than defending colonialism” (1993, 103).
6 Almost totally because we do see signs of his concern for others. He does manifest fatherly 
feelings for his son, not necessarily obstinate or wrong-headed in every respect. He does lend 
the Toyota pick-up to his unsufferable Boer neighbour, Old De Beer. He does give instructions 
to Jacobus to assist the dead man’s reburial (“Jacobus must look after everything nicely”) even if 
Mehring himself does not even want to hear about it (1978, 266).
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he is warned that he is a racist after all, he would even “make the world over, 
if it were easy as that” (1978, 81), and he does have racially-motivated survival 
reflexes (he turns his back on everything and runs in the end). However, the real 
clue to his mentality and the fundamental source of who he is, and therefore 
to the dual identity of this racialized subject is the third (covert) meaning of 
“conservationist:” he internalized (conserved internally) the ruling white elite’s 
view of the apartness of racialized South Africa. What the narrative is doing here 
– as it is processing Mehring through his story, so to say – can be described 
with cognitive naratologist Manfred Jahn’s flow-charting method (“an adaptation 
of Bremond’s model”): the internalization of the external into an internal story, 
which is then externalized into an external story (2003, 201). In our context: it is 
the external (the racist apartheid world) internalized by Mehring which is then 
externalized as the Mehring-story, viewed both internally (through presenting his 
mental activity) and externally (by the objective narrator).
Racialized Cognitive Architecture: Representation
“Representation” is one of the key notions of postcolonial theory, and that 
theoretical idea is relevant in our case too. (I will take up that line later below.) As 
for the level of “representationalism” of cognitive architecture, it “systematizes 
our mentalistic idiom, developing it into a system of structures (‘working 
memory,’ ‘episodic memory,’ and so on), process (‘memory consolidation,’ 
‘memory retrieval,’ etc.), and contents (e.g. particular images from one’s past 
experience)” (Hogan 2010, 239). In order to make the subject manageable, 
we need to limit our enquiry into the representationalism-level of Mehring’s 
cognitive architecture to what and how his mind stores of general knowledge and 
of his personal experience (the latter also forms part of his knowledge). In other 
words, what the representations of these would be in his knowledge system. The 
way we can access and evaluate Mehring’s multi-component knowledge is – as 
has been indicated above – by confronting it with our own general knowledge of 
the world and with the way we, the readers store (i.e. represent) what Mehring 
experiences (both of his social environment in general and as personal experience 
as an individual in particular). The name of the game for the reader is comparing 
representations: Mehring’s and ours. We can do this only partly on the basis 
of our own general knowledge of the world. We also need to rely on what we 
gather about Mehring’s general knowledge of the world as well as about what his 
personal experiences are, and how he stores them. Our source regarding the latter 
(i.e. his mental representation of general knowledge and personal experience 
stored in his long-term memory as his knowledge) is what Emmott’s narrative-
comprehension theory calls the reader’s “text-specific knowledge,” – information 
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“stored in the mental representation of a character” (1997, 7 and 19). For us, it 
is information that we gather from the text, as we process the narrative, about 
Mehring’s representations.
Our text-specific knowledge does confirm what Rita Barnard establishes about 
how the pastoral that our industrialist protagonist hoped for when he bought a 
farm turns out to be an ironic one against an apartheid background. Apartheid 
did not “simply” marginalize black Africans; rather, it was a world of “forced 
removals” and brutal relocations of the black population whose civil rights were 
absolutely denied in the first place (2007, 71 and 76). The way the dead black 
stranger is shoveled in by the police without investigation, itself alludes to the total 
denial of rights. It is the rights of the native people and their right to live which 
are declared dead and are buried here symbolically. What makes the “misdirected 
pastoralism” – “the ultimate symbol of white capitalist corruption and alienation” 
(Kathrin M. Wagner 1993, 85) impossible is also that Mehring himself is racist. It 
is enough to look at his entity representation when he is first led to the dead man 
by Jacobus and first espies the corpse (the point of view is Mehring’s): “One of 
them” (1978, 15). He does not call the people to whom the land belongs “blacks,” 
not even in his thoughts. The denied other of the apartheid is just “they” and 
“them” for him. He is “incapable of seeing other (black) human beings in other 
than functional terms,” Dorothy Driver notes (1990, 190). Once it is as bad as this, 
it may not be going too far to suggest that foreman Jacobus, who does his best to 
balance between the master and “them” (Jacobus’s own people) is introduced and 
referred to by Mehring as his “herdsman.” It may be another indirect allusion, in 
which the cowherd is only one step removed from the black “herd” or “herdsman 
of the black” – keeper/manager of the black “herd,” some of whom are Mehring’s 
farm workers and all of whom live behind a barbed-wire fence on the “location.”7 
Mehring’s intermental (actual and imagined actual) dispute, and to a much 
greater extent intramental (i.e. recollected) debate with Antonia and Terry open 
up a rich mine of representations.8 And here it is not the cliché that triumphs: 
Antonia’s and Terry’s representations as Mehring stored them in his mind are 
much more complex and sophisticated than Mehring’s representation in their 
mind. They are the ones who break away from racist schemata and scripts 
(especially political activist Antonia does), yet their view of Mehring is cliché-
ridden. (See the mental representation of the white industrialist’s relation to the 
7 Gordimer regarded apartheid much worse than even “colonial racism” (see her Gross-interview, 
1990, 307).
8 It is also rich in metarepresentation. We “metarepresent” our representations if we “keep track 
of sources of our representations.” It is “a particular cognitive endowment closely related to 
our mind-reading ability” (Zunshine 2006, 47). Mehring does keep track of the sources of his 
representations and keeps evaluating them. As for his lover and his son, he does not accept them 
as a source. The mental process that leads him to this decision is cognition about cognition, a 
representation regarding representation – i.e. metacognition or metarepresentation.
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land in Antiona’s mind [1978, 176–178].) Mehring may be captive to much of 
the colonialist/apartheid mentality, and his contempt for scripts of convention 
may not go far beyond avoiding parties and new-year messages by not responding 
to people’s phonecalls. And here, once more, we sense dramatic irony: the 
objective narrator winking at us from behind his protagonist’s back because of the 
conflicting logic of such a behaviour. Yet, subconsciously, Mehring probably does 
feel that he accumulated some representational deficit in the racialized world and 
the reason for it is the very social side on which he stands. So he is trying to make 
up for some of it by conscious experience-acquisition when he lies down on the 
ground in the very position the black corpse was found lying – “his non-rational 
physical sympathy with the dead man” (Smith 1993, 50). Although this is itself 
a conflictive image as the objective narrator may also allude to the naive if not 
ridiculous nature of the moment on somebody’s part who contributes to the blacks 
becoming social outcasts even if he is not promoting the ideology, apartheid being 
the largest and deterministic frame in South Africa between 1948 and 1994. 
The circumstances of his desertion of the farm may also be ridiculous – and, 
for him, most humiliating – at the end of the novel, but the cognitive approach 
sheds a different light on it. The interpretation Mehring puts on the incident 
(a woman who may or may not have trapped him; a strange man, who may or 
may not want to rob, kill or castrate him [1978, 262]) can be seen as Mehring’s 
inference, triggered by racist schematas and scripts. The Afrikaans-speaking man 
may have wished “to protect” him (as vice squad or a “guardian of the purity of 
the master race” [1978, 263]), but the incident brought Mehring to the end of his 
tether, because his inner representations tell him something else. Let me surmise 
that Emmott’s contextual frame theory will help us out as for what that something 
else can be. “The ‘contextual frame’ stores information about which characters 
are co-present in which location at which time” in a narrative. And, besides 
overt participants, unmentioned participants can be covertly present in the same 
location at the same time (Emmott 2003, 304). I submit that the participant who 
is not present in the Mehring-scene is the dead black man. 
The dead man is the most significant participant, who is not present overtly/
physically at this location at this time, but is co-present in our contextual frame, 
especially because Mehring himself links the disgraceful incident to that of the 
murdered stranger in his intramental reflections. He is suddenly paranoid and 
scared, not simply because “[t]hese are the bastards who shovelled him [the black 
corpse] in as you might fling a handful of earth on the corpse of a rat, just to 
cover the stink” (1978, 263). But also because his human decency gets the upper 
hand in him concerning the dead black man, and because he feels (probably 
also as a result of the inner representations yielded by his racial experience and 
meditations) that the time for his own burial has arrived, and these people are 
here to shovel him in, this time. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say: apartheid 
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caught up with Mehring at this point, the poetic justice part of it certainly did – 
poetic justice meted out by the objective narrator. Justice is administered in the 
fashion we have already seen at work in the novel: through the allusive technique 
that makes readerly inference possible. The thought that crosses Mehring’s mind 
that perhaps the time for his own burial arrived is an allusion, which implies 
(the reader infers) that Mehring is the stranger, metaphorically speaking (a 
stranger in the land of the many sub-Sahara black tribes of South Africa). The 
objective narrator makes us aware of how Mehring, who views himself as the 
triumphant industrialist now ready to learn how to be a good farmer is in fact 
struggling more and more flounderingly in the role in which he is positioned in 
the apartheid world. Mehring, the “the stranger” is doomed to death in a socio-
cognitive sense (because his social role is); and he (what he represents socially) 
is buried (symbolically) when the black corpse is buried. This does identify him, 
metaphorically, with the murdered stranger. Mehring, the colonialist-“stranger” 
is doomed to death, has been dying gradually as he realized it faintly and then 
more and more vividly, but now he is “murdered,” figuratively speaking (turns 
his back on the farm, on the pastoral dream in apartheid hell and on his racist 
role in it). Our forward-oriented local inference, on reading the scene in question, 
is that he will try to get away alive. Our forward-oriented global inference is 
that black South Africa is moving towards liberation. After all, as Gordimer 
explained in the Hurwitt-interview, the funeral of the unknown man is a reburial 
when his own land receives him at long last (“he has now been put with proper 
ceremony into his own earth”). In other words, the “disguised message” of the 
“resurrection theme” is at work here (1990, 150), the resurrection of the black 
African in South Africa. In Stephen Clingman’s words: “the raising of the black 
body simultaneously represents a ‘return of the repressed’ on both political 
and psychological levels” (1990, 208). But a backward-oriented global readerly 
inference, established by a network of allusions, can certainly take it one step 
further and indicate that Mehring was the dead stranger all through. The question 
was: how much intermental and intramental work it took for him to realize it too. 
The Conservationist is the process of that realization.
Memories and narratives are removed from previous experience, Mark 
Freeman theorizes, but they “still deserve to be considered real and potentially 
important as sources of information about ourselves and our past” (1993, 91). 
As his memories and representations are for Mehring. His memories are too 
many and more important than he believed them to be (his former strategy of 
willed noninvolvement and isolation fails). We can adapt Uri Margolin’s phrase 
to describe what happens to him: what we are witnessing is “perceptual system 
shutdown or crash,” where the mind is overwhelmed with impressions and 
our ability to decode them is reduced (2003, 289) – if by “perceptual” we mean 
mental perception instead of the physical.
Brought to you by | University of Debrecen
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/15/19 12:33 PM
17Conflicting Narrative Identity Formation in Racialized Intercultural...
Manifestations of Racialized Cognitive Architecture: 
Intra- and Intermental Activity, Positioning
What is stored in the levels of intentionality and representations of Mehring’s 
cognitive architecture as his knowledge that motivates his cognition is revealed 
in his intramental and intermental activity as well as in his positioning. We 
have already seen details illustrating how the intra- and intermental point, 
centripetally, to what Mehring’s cognitive architecture contains as the source of 
those mental activities. But if we examine this relation from an inverse direction 
– i.e. intra- and intermental activity as manifestations of cognitive architecture 
– the reversed (centrifugal) perspective reveals features of Mehring’s cognitive 
behaviour that would otherwise remain hidden.
What makes our conservative-conservationist protagonist a much more complex 
figure than those who seem to be progressive in thinking by comparison (Antonia 
and Terry) is that although we expect the political conservationist in him to be 
fully guided by his intentionality, and that he will live up to the requirements 
of his representations – in fact he cannot entirely, not in every respect. The 
realization dawns upon the attentive reader early as a forward-oriented inference. 
Mehring refers to the murdered black man as just “one of them” (1978, 15), as 
already mentioned. Yet, he instructs Jacobus in the closing sentence of the first 
chapter-like unit of the text, motivated by some innate humanness, to cover the 
dead man with something: “You’d better take something – to put over, down 
there. (His head jerks towards the river.) A tarpaulin. Or sacks” (1978, 21). True, 
he avoids to refer to him even as “him.” Paradoxically, Mehring’s reaction, once 
he has seen the dead man, is already an improvement on the initial colonial 
arrogance with which he related to the news when Jacobus first communicated it 
to him and he responded by asking: “Why should I go to look at a dead man near 
the river?” (1978, 13). 
What our cognitive narratological approach helps us notice very soon is 
that Mehring’s intramental and intermental activities (his recollections and 
meditations, on the one hand, and his interpersonal exchanges, on the other 
hand) do not go hand in hand. While intermentally he is a faithful representative 
of the socially constructed role racial discrimination prescribes for the English-
speaking white boss (he wants to keep an eye on everything, to have his orders 
obeyed and detests black Africans), intramentally he is a realist too. Racist power 
discourse assigns him a place at the top, but intramentally he has no illusions: 
“They [the blacks] know everything about us” (1978, 57); “They have been there 
all the time and they will continue to be there. They have nothing and they have 
nothing to lose” (1978, 260). Intermentally he never uses the harsh tone with 
Antonia that she adopts with him, but intramentally he is right (the realist again) 
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about how her kind of radicalism is shallow and does not take the world very far. 
In intermental negotiations he is often tough with his son, Terry, but intramentally 
he does cherish genuine fatherly feelings for him. 
Mehring’s mind “habitually runs” on a “fine criss-cross of grooves” (1978, 58). 
He senses a “gap” that “lies at a deeper level in the text than the undeniable truth 
of the white man’s ultimate failure to possess the land.” It arouses “terror in him, 
the sense of standing over an abyss” (Levy 2006, 113). Our context can refine the 
point further: the “fine criss-cross of grooves” of his mind makes it possible for him 
to confront his cognitive intentionalism and the representations of his knowledge 
systems with his experiential knowledge of the world. Thus he is engaging in a 
task which will be the reader’s too, who, in turn, will compare Mehring’s cognitive 
architecture with his/her own. The resulting slow process of transformation, is 
checked and qualified and barely discernable in his intermental activity. But he is 
indeed making steady progress intramentally, with the nameless black corpse as a 
concealed catalyst, until Mehring’s subconscious and formless dissociation from 
his dream of colonialist pastoralism takes shape in his mind, overwhelms him and 
erupts from under the surface in that humiliating scene at the end of his story. 
However, all this takes place inside Mehring. At this point one would expect 
the intramental and the intermental to be in full accord. But very few sentences are 
actually exchanged intermentally, no matter how radical the nature of Mehring’s 
decision is. In what is a brilliant piece of writing, the clashing intermental 
confrontation between Mehring and the “thick-headed ox, guardian of the purity 
of the master race” (1978, 263) all takes place intramentally, in Mehring’s mind 
(1978, 261–265). It is one of the many moments (but the most crucial one) of 
the intramentally presented intermental in the novel. It can also be seen as the 
intensively imagined intermental that effects a decisive change in the realm of 
the intramental. 
And with this we have reached the problematic of positioning. The protagonist 
of The Conservationist is the embodiment of a paradox, therefore his position is 
paradoxical. Colonial-reflexed postcolonial apartheid is itself a paradox. That is 
the external that Mehring internalized, which internal story is then externalized 
as his story, mostly through his intramental activity as we have just seen. And his 
story is about how he has been positioned by this culture.9 But, as we saw earlier, 
he also develops dilemmas related to his position. The more closely he examines 
his alienating and alienated role, the more distressed he becomes. 
The whole novel can be regarded as a narrative of position-discomposure – a 
novel of repositioning eventually. Gordimer called her central character “a kind 
9 Our place in society depends on the role we take, Gordimer argues. We may run away from our 
“inevitable role,” or we can “take it on.” “But the fact is that you have a role; there is no such 
thing as an ivory tower – that’s a place in itself. You are consciously or unconsciously creating 
a position in your society” (Gray 1990, 180).
Brought to you by | University of Debrecen
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/15/19 12:33 PM
19Conflicting Narrative Identity Formation in Racialized Intercultural...
of fossil” in the Schwartz interview (1990, 80). And he is too, in that he is the 
walking embodiment of an outdated social establishment. An establishment that 
forces Jacobus, Mehring’s black foreman into a seemingly easy-to-mold position, 
a good illustration of what Homi Bhabha described as mimicry. 
Jacobus is a position-shifter depending on who he is dealing with. It is an 
existential imperative for him to do the job to Mehring’s satisfaction; but he also 
does his best to help his own people on the sly side. Jacobus’s positioning differs 
from the rest of the blacks. The latter are positioned by apartheid to be undesirable 
and oppressed aliens in their own country,10 but his positioning comes from 
Mehring, one character positioning the other. So his activity as a double narrative 
agent of the storyworld, i.e. serving Mehring, the white boss, but trying to help 
his black people too, means that in his intramental cognitive operations he rejects 
the positioning that comes to him from Mehring. “An ironic compromise,” “the 
sign of a double articulation” is what mimicry is in Bhabha’s definition; pretended 
accommodation, inclusive of its difference “that is itself a process of disavowal” 
(1994, 86). This makes Jacobus a skillful juggler of positions: he tells the black 
women “to warn the children not to collect eggs where they could be seen,” and 
reassures his conservationist white boss that “there were plenty of guinea fowl 
about if you had to be up at work early enough to see them” (1978, 33). “[T]he 
discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence” after all  (Bhabha 
1994, 86; emphasis in the original). As for Mehring, he may be fossil, but he is 
certainly not petrified. We see him, as we read on, more and more as a man of 
“disjointed consciousness” – also Gordimer’s words, this time from the Diana 
Cooper-Clark interview (1990, 225). In the cognitive narratological context of the 
present study we can say that what Mehring is experiencing is a widening rift 
between his position and his positioning cognitive architecture.
Communication
“[I]t needs to be made clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture 
that what is commonly circulated by it is not ‘truth’ but representations,” Edward 
Said claims about culture and representation in general, adding: “there is no 
such thing as a delivered presence, but a re-presence, or a representation”  (1979, 
21; emphasis in the original). We have already seen the racialized level of such 
colonial representations in Mehring’s cognitive architecture that bear the mark 
of apartheid. Thus what we find in The Conservationist is that it is also about 
the impossibility of intercultural communication in a de jure postcolonial but de 
facto colonial world of racial segregation. Communication is completely racialized 
10 “What is South Africa?” Frantz Fanon asks. “A boiler into which thirteen million blacks are 
clubbed and penned in by two and a half million whites” (1968, 87).
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in the apartheid South Africa of Gordimer’s novel. When group communication 
shifts from the intercultural to an interracial basis in a racist environment, interest 
in the – marked or unmarked11 – culture of the racial other is eclipsed.
A whole array of incidents and communicative details illustrates the following 
two points that appear to be the same but are different: one, interest in intercultural 
presence is killed by racist representations; two, meaningful interracial 
communication is made impossible by trivial and evasive communicative routines. 
To appreciate the first point (absence of intercultural presence), it is enough to 
realize that we cannot detect any genuine black African cultural presence in the 
storyworld-agents’ communications. It is absent from the novel in every respect 
other than the objective narrator’s indirect discourse (e.g. symbolic suggestions).12 
As a matter of fact, any kind of preoccupation with the racial other’s culture is 
totally absent all along the racial line, be it the English-speaking industrialist 
Mehring, the Africaner De Beer and his family, or the immigrant owner of the 
Indian store and his family. There is no sign of positive inter- or crosscultural 
engagement among them either. And they all have a contempt for blacks and 
black culture. Mehring detests the Afrikaners and keeps his distance from black 
Africans as much as he can. He is sharply aware of Jacobus’s interracial agency: 
Jacobus serves the white man but also helps the blacks; Mehring lets “them” 
bury the murdered stranger if they want to – but he wants to have nothing to do 
with “them.” Nor do his frequent travels to other countries mean anything to him 
culturally, no sign of cultural pursuits or memories concerning cultures outside 
South Africa (Japan, for example). Afrikaner De Beer does cherish history, but it 
is the Boer history of heroes of the Boer wars, prime ministers, politicians who 
implemented apartheid and signed their photos for him; not mentioning his own 
grandfather, who fought in the Kaffir Wars, and a “kaffir” doll13 the grandfather 
took from a Kaffir chief before they burned his place (1978, 54–55). Such details 
speak for themselves. But Mehring is full of uncertainties concerning his own 
“I” identity, both individual and personal, and his collective or “we” identity14 
comes under fire from Antonia and Terry. He can speak Afrikaans – “the white 
man’s other language” – but he uses it only when he speaks to officials (1978, 17). 
11 It is Roy Wagner’s distinction. As opposed to the marked (narrower) sense of culture (literature 
and the arts), “culture” is used in my essay in the unmarked (broad) sense, to include “science, 
art, and technology, the sum total of achievements, inventions, and discoveries” (Roy Wagner 
1981, 22), “unmarked” to the immense extent that cognitive cultural studies broadens it, viewing 
culture, as Raymond Williams did, as “a whole way of life” (Zunshine 2010a, 8). 
12 See, for example, Kathrin M. Wagner on Gordimer’s “landscape iconography,” Lars Engle 
discussing The Conservationist in the context of the Rev. Henry Callaway’s The Religious System 
of the Amazulu (1993, 95 and on), or Michael Thorpe on how “[t]he ancestor motif centers upon 
the unknown man who near the beginning is found murdered on Mehring’s farm” (1990, 117).
13 “Kaffir” used for a long time by white colonizers to refer to black Africans is a cruelly offensive 
word today.
14 Jan Assmann’s categories (2011, 112–113).
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If his intercultural dislike of the Dutch does not show through in his interpersonal 
handling of the De Beers’s visit and he generously lends them what they want 
before they ask for it, it is because he wants to shake them off as fast as possible. 
Black foreman Jacobus loathes the Boers more than Mehring does, resents his boss 
lending De Beer his Toyota pickup and tells Mehring so. And the way Gordimer’s 
Indian immigrants feel in South Africa adds further details to what Vasu Reddy 
tells us about what South African writers of Indian origin emphasize in their 
works: “the dehumanizing effects of racial oppression” (2001, 83). 
Human conversations evolve, John J. Gumperz informs us, along the “culturally 
possible lines of reasoning” (1982, 160). The conversations that apartheid culture 
makes possible – turning now to the second point of banal and elusive speech 
acts – are the trivial and evasive communicative routines that follow from what 
we have just seen in particular, but also from the racialization of intercultural 
communication in general. Mehring has no doubt that the blacks “are busy 
complaining about him in the safety of their own language, they retreat into it 
and they can say what they like”  (1978, 75; emphasis in the original); and “[t]he 
children don’t understand the language,” English that is (1978, 10). Interracial 
communication between, say, Mehring and Jacobus, is possible only through 
“the conventions of polite conversation” (1978, 223–224). It is always “the 
usual sort of exchange between his black man and himself” (1978, 58). Between 
the Boers and Mehring communcation is “the well-regulated demands and 
responses” (1978, 58). When De Beer wants to ask Mehring something, it goes 
like this: “There has been a whole preamble of small talk about the weather, the 
drought, the usual thing before getting to the point” (1978, 49). Apartheid South 
Africa may be part of the reader’s general knowledge as s/he starts reading The 
Conservationist but as we read the novel, we gradually acquire the text-specific 
knowledge that intercultural communication in this racist culture is not really 
inter and not real communication. Intercultural skills simply mean a skillful 
manipulation of communicative surfaces as dictated by, and can be expected 
from, one’s (Mehring’s, Jacobus’s, and the others’) position in this particular 
sociocultural hierarchy. It is Jacobus’s position that makes him quite an artist 
of evasive communication and communicative manoevring. He is “not without 
sycophancy” in Mehring’s presence (Mehring finds, intramentally) (1978, 12); 
in the presence of others he “agrees with everything that Mehring says, rather 
than gives an independent answer” (1978, 56), although Mehring will soon find, 
when they are alone, that Jacobus does have an independent view of the matter. 
But the blacks look up to the black foreman since “they knew Jacobus was the 
boss of the show, he ran that farm while the white man lived in town” (1978, 
37). A careful look at how these two conduct their interpersonal dealings with 
each other shows that intramentally both argue stubbornly (whether it is the 
guinea fowl issue or whether they need a fierce dog or not [1978, 32–33]), but 
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intermentally the strategy is always clash-avoidance on Jacobus’s part, the round-
about method. His disagreement with a negative point Mehring raises is always 
through a positive idea. This brings us to the matter of discourse, a subject which 
has been crying for attention in this paper for a while.
Conclusion: Discourse and Narrative Identity
But it would be sheer tautology to repeat the points already made about 
how apartheid is a racist discourse, anti-apartheid narratorial feelings are a 
counterdiscourse, and the characters have their own discourse. What we would 
capture in our discursive net if cast this way would be only parts (significant 
constituents, though) of the main discursive concern of the narrative as a whole 
– of the global narrative discourse. 
We can look for The Conservationist’s global narrative discourse in the narratorial 
consciousness. As I claimed elsewhere in a narrato-cultural essay: “a narratorial 
mind is not simply present in a narrative text, but the text is the content of that 
mind since what the text contains is the product of a narrator’s or an implied 
author’s consciousness” (Abádi-Nagy 2008, 21). And our extradiegetic (external) 
teller of the tale (Gordimer calls her “objective narrator” as indicated earlier) is 
an implied-author narrator, who has an anti-apartheid mindset, and that is the 
cultural determination that produces and rules the Gordimer novel’s text (the what 
of the narrative) and shapes the narrative (the how). Without getting entagled in 
the intricacies of Seymour Chatman’s definitions of content and expression (story 
and discourse) planes vis-à-vis substance and form,15 I wish to adopt his idea of 
“deep narrative predicate,” which is not the same as (though constructed through 
a series of) “surface lingusitic predicates” (1978, 146). A deep narrative predicate 
can determine not only longer stretches of narrative, but a whole work, narrated 
or nonnarrated, directly or in mediated ways, embedded directly or indirectly 
15 Above I quoted Gordimer on how the main points the novel is making are “implicit.” Where 
can we look for what is implicit in The Conservationist? It can be found in the narrative 
discourse, as we process it, in both the narratological and the discourse analysis senses of the 
term “discourse.” And the two are closely interrelated. Ever since Seymour Chatman introduced 
the distinction between story and discourse – content versus expression (1978, 26 and on) 
– discourse is the how, the manner as opposed to the story-line, the subject, the what. It is 
the way as David Herman puts it: it is “the method of narrative presentation,” “the mode of 
telling,” “the manner in which those events are organized in the recounting” (2002, 214). And 
by focusing on the expression level of the story or the manner of telling (the narratological sense 
of discourse), we will be attentive to discourse entities, discourse units, and discourse structure 
in the discourse-analysis sense. To put it in a more narrative-specific way, in Herman’s words 
elsewhere (based on Catherine Emmott): “narrative can be viewed as a discourse environment 
in which producers as well as interpreters of stories use many different linguistic resources – or 
coding strategies – to establish and maintain reference to discourse entitites that interact with 
one another in narrative-specific ways” (2003, 13).
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in narratorial consciousness or/and storyworld character-focalizers. The deep 
narrative predicate – what can be called narratorial global discourse in the contexts 
of this paper – was already mentioned above as the widening rift between Mehring’s 
position and the apartheid-driven cognitive architecture that positions him. The 
Conservationist’s mediated discursive point is that such a seemingly unresolvable 
tension, culminating in a rift, necessarily disjoins a sensitive human individual 
from his or her own cognitive architecture in a brutally inhuman society, even if 
that sensitivity is internally half-buried already under the social values that the 
individual incorporated into his or her own cognitive architecture. This global 
narrative discourse or deep narrative predicate organizes the how of Gordimer’s 
narrative in the senses Chatman theorizes the how: the “structure of narrative 
transmission” (“form of expression”) and enfolding discourse “manifestations” 
(“substance of expression”) (1978, 26). Let it suffice to say, more simply, in the 
concrete terms of the novel, what the how that Gordimer’s deep narrative predicate 
develops in the novel is: the narrator processes Mehring through a series of events/
actions and recollections (inter- and intramental activities), making him think over 
who he is, what his position in apartheid society is. After all, as Frantz Fanon 
asserts relating to (otherwise mainly reacting against) French psychoanalyst Octave 
Mannoni’s ideas: “the problem of colonialism includes not only the interrelations 
of objective conditions but also human attitudes toward these conditions” (1968, 
84). In turn, through Mehring’s own narratives that narrativize the formation of 
his narrative identity, the extradiegetic anti-apartheid narrator herself thinks 
apartheid-driven South Africa over, adjusting Mehring’s perspectival filtering 
to align the reader with the narratorial vantage point. In a word, the discursive 
method is mapping socio-cultural cognition here.16 
If The Conservationist is the cognitive cultural mapping of its deep narrative 
predicate, the “plot” (not in the usual sense because much more of the novel 
is stasis than action) will be mental. How? Similarly to the way every single 
narrative entity (characters, objects, and narrative space17) is inscribed with the 
deep narrative predicate, the contextual blocks or discourse units, each and every 
one of them are also weaving the same global discourse of the narrative, through 
a series of local discourse contexts. This is yet another (the third), the discourse-
analysis sense of “discourse.” It is an understanding of a discourse unit which 
points to a unit of content, perhaps inclusive of subsidiary events and/or changing 
locations, but remaining inside the same local narrative context (Emmott 1997, 
16 It is not identical with “cognitive mapping.” The latter is reserved to mean, in a narrower sense: 
“a mental model in spatial relations;” in the extended sense as used by Marie-Laure Ryan: 
the readerly construction of narrative space “as a background for the understanding of plot, 
character motivations, and the moral issues articulated in the text” (Ryan 2003, 215–216).
17 Gordimer’s copius descriptions of various aspects of landscape and space thoroughly imbued 
with thematic concerns and symbolic significance have been given ample treatment in Gordimer 
criticism. (See Brian Macaskill [1993] and Kathrin M. Wagner [1993].)
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12–13). Our example can be the De Beer family’s visit with Mehring as one and 
the same local discourse context, in spite of the shifts from the Mehring/De Beer 
interpersonal exchange in Mehring’s house to Jacobus and De Beer outside and 
then the switch to the Jacobus/Mehring confrontation over the De Beer visit. It is 
also the global narrative discourse which is woven in the discourse structure of 
the shifting contextual units that the text divides into or is putting itself together 
through. In our De Beer-visit example the kaffir doll – as only one hint at racial 
intolerance among the many – is a case in point. 
The way global discourse units can be built into multiple local discourse 
units (contexts) is not only through discourse (deep-predicate) distribution. The 
narrato-rhetorical purpose is also served by cultural narrato-rhetorhemes18 which 
also shape Mehring’s narrative identity. Some of the narrato-rhetorhemes can 
have global narrative functions, as, most outstandingly, the governing trope of 
the murdered black stranger does. The dead man highlights the South African 
social condition that Fanon talks about; very slowly and behaviouristically it 
also awakens Mehring to realize, at first only very vaguely and then with growing 
intensity, where he stands with where he is. He senses that “his relation to the 
land he owns but cannot possess,” as Rowland Smith remarks, is “inauthentic,” 
this being “part of Mehring’s crisis of consciousness;” and the “internal and 
imagined” debates with Antonia and Terry become “ultimately destabilizing” 
(1993, 50). Let us add that his attitude towards his own position can at long last 
take the shape of severing ties with his own position as a farmer at least at the 
level of a sudden gut-reaction after all those rationalizations. 
But the gut-reaction that ensued was also provoked by those rationalizations. We 
can tell from a series of inferences. That we have to rely on inferences (he is a much 
more complex socio-cultural construct than his mistress’s and his son’s simplified 
views of him could justify) is indicative of the paradox the Mehring-phenomenon 
revolves around, ultimately: his identity turns out to be, eventually, unnarratable 
by himself even to himself; yet this becomes the source of the narrativity of such an 
identity. It speaks to the productivity of cognitive narratology that its methodology 
made the inference of a cognitive rift in Mehring possible. Since that cognitive rift 
can be read to be rooted in a sociocultural split in the individual’s identity, we 
18 The narrato-rhetorical units that I called cultural “narrato-rhetorhemes” in a separate study 
are narrative units loaded with cultural content and rhetorical purpose, meant to develop and 
frame the cultural narrative rhetoric. It is rhetorical suasion through culture in the narrative. 
A narrato-rhetorheme can be a functionally restricted cultural sign or one that encompasses 
a whole book. Elemental or immensely complex, it can convey overt or covert rhetorical 
content in the storyworld, on the narratorial discourse level, or anywhere else in the multiple 
communicative intricacy called narrative fiction. It is by leaving the category undefined in 
more specific terms that it can retain the flexibility to take in, in an unregulated fashion, the 
rhetorically marked multiplicity, heteroglossia, and transformations of textual manoeuvres 
of persuasion; an analytical tool which is hoped to make an intricate narrative “traffic” of 
discursive communications manageable for theory and criticism. (Cf. Abádi-Nagy 2014, 35–39.)
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can also rephrase our diagnosis of Mehring. Paul Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of the 
self” (1994, 16) posits that “[t]he narrative constructs the identity of the character, 
what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story 
told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character” (1994, 
147–148). And the identity of the story told in The Conservationist describes an 
individual who lives and behaves as almost a mechanism of a set of “acquired 
identifications.” “To a large extent,” Ricoeur goes on to say, “ […] the identity of 
a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, 
ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community recognizes 
itself. Recognizing oneself in contributes to recognizing onself by .” It is “otherness 
assumed as one’s own” (1994, 121; emphasis in the original). The Mehring-
phenomenon can be rediagnosed, his narrative identity that his story projects onto 
the pages of the novel redescribed, then, as the case when the other claims the 
same: the other of acquired colonialist-apartheid identifications enters into the 
composition of the same, to produce the concordance of the narrative identity (a 
clearly negative concordance) that identifies Mehring.
But the identity of all narrative compositions can be described, Ricoeur advises 
us, not simply as concordance but as “the synthesis of the heterogeneous,” a 
“configuration” of “discordant concordance” (1994, 141). His theoretical insight 
vividly illuminates both the alienated stasis and the rift as well as the slow movement 
away from stasis that construct Mehring’s narrative identity. The discordant element 
is introduced into concordance with the discovery of the murdered African. The 
dead stranger slowly activates Mehring’s innate self – the innate self of a man who 
has almost totally become a dead stranger himself by any standards of opennes 
to human rights and democracy. The circumstance that he is intelligent enough 
to comprehend what is happening to him and is bent (even if instinctively and 
reluctantly at first) on expelling as much of the other from the same as he is capable 
of at the stage where the novel leaves him (or, bent on resisting the other, which 
other is bent on expelling the same out of him, if you like). 
This capability is – if not a resurrection as the black man’s is through his reburial 
– is at least a promise of at least one white man coming to his senses. It is a factor 
that makes it possible for anti-apartheid Nadine Gordimer to treat a basically 
despicable character like Mehring with qualified sympathy. Judith Levy rightly 
points out, “contrary to prevailing critical opinion” that “in the delineation of the 
protagonist in The Conservationist, the vision of the individual on a personal inner 
quest has not been wholly superceded by this character’s representing and playing 
out the inevitable destiny of his class and status. Rather, these two visions exist side 
by side, expressing, perhaps, ambivalence on the part of Gordimer herself” (2006, 
103). Except that it remains sympathy that cannot be regarded ambivalence on the 
novelist’s part. Let me grant Gordimer herself the right to decide the issue. In her 
response to a Peter Marchant interview question she said: Mehring “is just exactly 
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the kind of man I hate in South Africa. But, once I began to write about him and got 
under his skin, I began to understand him better. I don’t believe that to understand 
all is to forgive all. Certainly in a country with conflict like my own, that’s a very 
dangerous attitude. But for a writer, it’s absolutely essential to understand all, and 
once you do, you cannot be entirely unsympathetic” (1990, 259). 
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